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The paper compares perspectives on the meaning of development in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s to the contemporary period, with a focus on the works of Dudley Seers and 
Amartya Sen. Both men were critical of the development literature of their times. Seers 
was especially critical of neoclassicism’s universal claims and economic growth as the 
prime objective. For Sen, development involves reducing deprivation or broadening 
choice. One challenge for future work is for development economists, similar to Seers 
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1 Introduction 
How has the meaning of economic development changed during the twenty years of 
UNU-WIDER’s existence? This paper compares perspectives on the meaning of 
development economics in the late 1970s and early 1980s, just before WIDER’s 
inception, to contemporary perspectives. To narrow the focus from what would 
otherwise be an unmanageable task, I concentrate on two economists representative of 
these two periods. Two markers are, Dudley Seers (1969, 1979) for the earlier period, 
and Amartya Sen (1999) for the later. Here the meaning of development also 
encompasses measures and strategies of development and approaches to its study. 
Moreover, I examine work beyond these markers to provide more detail of the two 
men’s views. 
1.1  A thumbnail sketch of disciplinary changes during the last two decades 
Before examining Seers’ and Sen’s approaches, I mention a few changes in the 
discipline of development economics during the last 20-25 years. These changes, 
resulting from world events or new tools and advances that have influenced the field of 
development, are only representative and not comprehensive. Econometric tools permit 
us to examine how trade liberalization reduces least developed countries’ (LDCs) 
poverty1 and how financial liberalization increases LDC growth, at least in the long 
run.2 Recent enhanced tools, while not alleviating the imperfections of national income 
measures decried by Seers (1979: 14-18), expedite measuring net savings by subtracting 
capital depreciation, natural resource depletion, and damage from carbon dioxide and 
particulate emissions and adding spending on education.3 Work on national income at 
purchasing power parity (PPP), despite a margin of error, has improved comparisons 
and facilitated Maddison’s (1995, 2001, 2003) comparisons of economic wellbeing 
across decades, centuries, and epochs. 
 
Soviet economic collapse has influenced development priorities, making much of the 
Lange-Taylor versus von Mises-Hayek debate on feasible socialism moot. The collapse 
of state socialism has consigned the stage theory of Marx to the dustbin, but Marx’s 
underlying premise of the inevitability of conflict between ruling and oppressed classes 
(even international conflict à la Lenin and Baran) still has explanatory power. 
Moreover, high levels of Soviet environmental pollution revived an emphasis on how 
market distortions give rise to environmental degradation.4 Important here is the 
relationship between secure property and use rights, with de Soto’s The Mystery of 
                                                 
1 Cline (2004). 
2 Ranciere et al. (2003). 
3 World Bank (2003c: 119, 174-76); Arrow et al. (2004: 147-72). 
4 Panayotou (1993).   2
Capitalism’s (2000) insight that most of the world’s potential capital assets, outside the 
West and Japan, are dead capital, unusable under the legal property system and 
inaccessible as collateral for loans or to secure bonds. Soviet failure in collective 
agriculture has renewed interest in research by Berry and Cline (1979) showing an 
inverse relationship between the size of plot and land productivity, and that small farms 
have higher productivity due to fewer problems of supervision and greater incentives to 
invest and undertake improvements. 
 
Negative total factor productivity (TFP) before and during the Soviet collapse gave 
impetus to TFP examination, with a concern about recent negative TFP in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The information technology (IT) revolution and a shrinking globe mean an 
emphasis on LDCs availing themselves of global production networks and technological 
transfer, adaptation, and imitation5 rather than stressing self-reliance, as Seers did. 
 
The near-decade of falling national income in post-socialist states, together with work 
by North (1990) and Acemoglu et al. (2001), has contributed to a shift to the importance 
of institutions as a determinant of LDC and transitional growth among scholars and 
international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). The increase in Africa’s failed states, those states providing virtually no public 
goods and services to their citizens, has increased emphases, even by IFIs, on the 
importance of governance and the analysis of rent seeking, unproductive activity to 
obtain private benefit from public action and resources. Other differences between the 
earlier and later periods result from the rise of global competition6 and its effect on the 
increased share of the world’s middle class in Asia (especially China and India) and 
reduced share in the West,7 phenomena affecting national and global income inequality. 
The augmented neoclassical growth model (with an inclusion of human capital, 
especially health) and new endogenous growth model (with endogenous technology) 
increase the plausibility of numbers in recent empirical estimates of sources of growth. 
 
Today economists are more ambivalent about the benefits of aid. Our profession has 
improved monetary and fiscal instruments with a concomitant deceleration of inflation. 
Related to this, Bruno and Easterly (1998: 3-24) discovered no negative correlation 
between inflation and economic growth for inflation rates under 40 per cent annually. 
Population growth, although still rapid by half-century periods, has decelerated from 
1960 to the present.8 Recent empirical studies have established the negative impact of 
population growth on growth in GDP per capita (Barro 1997). In the last two decades, 
adjustment (macroeconomic stabilization, structural adjustment, and economic reform) 
                                                 
5 Addison (2003: 5); World Bank (1997: 2). 
6 Nayyar (1997). 
7 Bhalla (2002: 188). 
8 Nafziger (2006: 275).   3
has been universal for LDCs and transitional countries, a condition required for funding 
by the World Bank, the Group of Seven, and the lender of last resort, the IMF. The 
literature has discussed the implications of adjustment and reform for economic 
development.  
2  Seers and Sen as critics  
Both men were critical of the development literature of their times. For Seers, 
neoclassical economics had a flawed paradigm and dependency theory a lack of policy 
realism. After the fall of state socialism in 1989-91, the ideological struggles among 
economists diminished. Neoclassicism’s Washington Consensus of the World Bank, 
IMF, and the USA government reigned (Williamson 1993: 1329-36; 1994: 26-8). Sen 
did not focus on ideological issues but, according to the Nobel Prize committee, 
‘restored an ethical dimension to the discussion of economic problems’, such as 
development. 
2.1  A sketch of Seers’ and Sen’s purposes of development 
According to Seers (1979) the purpose of development is to reduce poverty, inequality, 
and unemployment. For Sen (1999), development involves reducing deprivation or 
broadening choice. Deprivation represents a multidimensional view of poverty that 
includes hunger, illiteracy, illness and poor health, powerlessness, voicelessness, 
insecurity, humiliation, and a lack of access to basic infrastructure (Narayan et al. 2000: 
4-5). 
2.2  Seers on neoclassicism’s universal claims 
For Seers, neoclassical economics greatest error was its universalizing from the West’s 
experience. For him, ‘the abler the student has been in absorbing the current doctrine, 
the more difficult the process of adaptation’ to the developing world (Seers 1963: 77). 
Calling a book that analyses the United States and the United Kingdom ‘Economic 
Principles’ is analogous to calling a book dealing with horses ‘Animals’. For Seers, 
development economics, in analysing the 75-80 per cent of the world in developing 
countries and the past experience of industrialized economies, is closer to principles of 
economics (Ibid.: 79). 
2.3  Seers on growth as the objective 
Immediately after the Second World War, scholars and third world governments were 
concerned with wider objectives than simply growth. However Lewis (1955: 9) set the 
tone for the late 1950s and 1960s when he noted that ‘our subject matter is growth, and 
not distribution’. But the stress of the UN’s first development decade (1960-70) on 
LDCs’ economic growth, which many alleged did not spread to the poorer half of the 
population, triggered widespread disillusionment. Seers (1969: 3-4) signalled the shift   4
away from the goal of growth by asking the following questions about a country’s 
development: 
What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to 
unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three of 
these have become less severe, then beyond doubt this has been a period 
of development for the country concerned. If one or two of these central 
problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would 
be strange to call the result ‘development’ even if per capita income has 
soared.9  
2.4 Measuring  Seers’  goals 
Since 1969, economists have made little progress in measuring unemployment rates, at 
least in LDCs with a majority agricultural labour force. Poverty and inequality data have 
improved substantially, with efforts at the World Bank by Jain (1975), Chenery et al. 
(1974), and Ahluwalia et al. (1979: 299-341) to make cross-national comparisons of 
poverty, and subsequent contributions by such economists as Klaus Deininger, Lyn 
Squire, Martin Ravallion, and Branko Milanovic. However, presently we have cross-
national figures on poverty and inequality but few by region or community within a 
nation, the figures Seers considered essential for policy. Identifying and reaching the 
poor to enable their geographical targeting requires detailed poverty mapping, with data 
on poverty assessment and ‘basic needs’ indicators at local levels (San Martin 2003: 
172-92). Few national surveys are adequate for ‘guid[ing] poverty alleviation efforts 
aimed at attacking poverty at local levels’ (Ibid.: 173). 
 
Was Seers naïve in setting goals that lacked policy-relevant measures in most LDCs? 
No. Today’s scarcity of subnational poverty information would not have surprised him. 
‘Those who hold power rarely have much interest in such matters, still less in attention 
being drawn to them. It is preferable to shelter behind the ‘growth rates’ that are 
commended in the reports of international agencies’ (Seers 1983: 6). Seers blames LDC 
governments’ inadequate information on a lack of will rather than competence. LDCs 
have: 
virtually no statistics anywhere on most of the aspects of life that really 
matter—the average distance people have to carry water and food; the 
numbers without shoes; the extent of overcrowding, the prevalence of 
violence; how many are unable to multiply one number by another, or 
summarize their own country’s history ... Naturally, there are no official 
data anywhere on the number tortured or killed by the police, or how 
many are in prison for political reasons ... Many of the more important 
social factors are inherently unquantifiable: how safe it is to criticize the 
                                                 
9 See also Viner (1953: 99-100), and Chenery et al. (1974) for similar expressions, and Meier’s (2005: 
4-5) discussion of them.   5
government publicly, or the chance of an objective trial, or how 
corruption affects policy decisions. But to say that these factors cannot 
be quantified, and are embarrassing subjects for those in power ... does 
not mean that they are unimportant or can be overlooked [when 
assessing] a country’s development. (Seers 1983: 5-6)10 
 
2.5  Seers on dependent development 
According to dependency theory, global changes in demand resulted in a new 
international division of labour in which the peripheral countries of Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America specialized in primary products in an enclave controlled by foreigners 
while importing consumer goods that were the fruits of technical progress in the central 
countries of the West. The increased productivity and new consumption patterns in 
peripheral countries benefited a small ruling class and its allies (less than a tenth of the 
population), who co-operated with the DCs to achieve modernization (economic 
development among a modernizing minority). The result is ‘peripheral capitalism, a 
capitalism unable to generate innovations and dependent for transformation upon 
decisions from the outside’ (Furtado 1973: 120). 
 
Dependency theorist Andre Gunder Frank criticized the view of many development 
scholars that contemporary underdeveloped countries resemble the earlier stages of 
now-developed countries. LDCs are economic satellites of the highly developed regions 
of North America and West Europe in the international capitalist system. The African, 
Asian and Latin American countries least integrated into this system tend to be the most 
highly developed. For Frank, Japanese economic development after 1868 is the classic 
case illustrating his theory. Japan’s industrial growth remains unmatched—Japan, 
unlike most of the rest of Asia, was never a capitalist satellite. Seers generally agrees 
with Frank on Japan, but emphasizes its selective borrowing, its slow pace of 
Westernization, and ‘an elite that has remained firmly Japanese’ (Seers 1983: 72). 
 
In his economic analysis, Seers, like the dependistas and unlike orthodox development 
economics of his day, included class, power, and imperialism by strong governments 
and economies against weak ones (Ibid.: 47). Seers was an admirer of Raul Prebisch, 
who analysed the world economy in terms of a core of industrial countries and a weak 
periphery of exporters of primary products’ (Ibid.: 52). Seers appointed him to the 
Institute of Development Studies’ governing board, a decision reinforced for Seers 
when the UK’s under-secretary for trade warned against Prebisch’s radicalism. 
 
                                                 
10 According to Seers (1983: 45): ‘Chicago-school economists are characterized by a much greater belief 
in quantitative techniques. They are thus more likely to restrict their analysis to variables which are 
quantifiable, and are particularly inclined to treat statistics as if they were facts.’   6
Fascination with Prebisch and the dependency school did not cloud Seers’ policy vision. 
He rejected the Prebisch-Frank policy prescription of import substitution that increased 
dependence on ‘imports of energy, intermediate goods, sophisticated equipment and 
technology [and] food’ and high protective barriers, which ‘created monopolistic 
conditions [and] discourag[ed] innovation’ (Ibid.: 53). Moreover, Seers recognized the 
limits of an LDC’s room to manoeuvre by delinking from the world economy, given 
USA and Western retaliation and intervention in response to expropriation of foreign 
capital. For him, ‘many who embark on an autonomous strategy with naïve optimism 
not merely lose power in a military coup and see their policies reversed, but also forfeit 
their liberties ... [or] even their lives’. Dependency theorists fail to recognize the 
constraints of too independent a policy and the importance of avoiding ‘the inflow of 
capital ... replaced by an outflow’. His class analysis suggests that the ‘decline in levels 
of living of the professional and managerial classes’ and their possible revolt reflects 
what dependency entails (Ibid.: 53-61). While dependent governments can take 
advantage of the internal divisions of the dominant power, they are limited by how 
inflation and the reduction of foreign exchange reserves can undermine support for 
populism (Ibid.: 61, 126).11 
2.6  Seers on development planning 
Deepak Lal’s Poverty of Development Economics (1985: 70-4) contends that LDC 
intellectuals, nationalist leaders, and politicians, in reacting to colonial capitalism, 
pushed for systematic state economic planning and intervention, especially in industry, 
to remove these deep-seated, capitalistic obstacles. Apparently Lal (1985: 103) views 
Seers as a proponent of dirigisme (statism). But Seers is sceptical of typical LDC state 
planning:  
Today, ‘planning’ calls up memories of teams of economic graduates, 
who would doubtless otherwise have been unemployed, frenetically 
drawing up five-year plans, largely quantitative and wholly economic, to 
be published with a good deal of fanfare. This is often good public 
relations, but whether it has much impact on [policy is] a different 
matter. Rarely does such a team have any real authority ... Typically, 
after a year or two, a plan is a dead letter: by then, the ... assumptions and 
... projections are clearly out of date, and the planning office is happily 
buckling down to prepare the next one ... It is time to move to quite a 
different type of planning; longer term, less economistic, not entirely 
quantitative. (Seers 1983: 94-5) 
 
For Seers, LDCs should emphasize development strategy, not planning for a large part 
of the economy (that is, the private sector) over which government has little control. 
Moreover, planning needs to be well integrated, with departments communicating with 
                                                 
11 Seers (1983: 146) also rejects calls for the new international economic order, seeing it as an effort to 
maintain national elites’ subjugation of the poor.   7
each other, and planners in contact with political leaders ‘on almost a day-to-day basis’ 
(Ibid.: 114). 
2.7  Sen’s economic goals 
For Sen (1999), freedom (not development) is the ultimate goal of economic life as well 
as the most efficient means of realizing general welfare. Overcoming deprivations is 
central to development. Unfreedoms include hunger, famine, ignorance, an 
unsustainable economic life, unemployment, barriers to economic fulfilment by women 
or minority communities, premature death, violation of political freedom and basic 
liberty, threats to the environment, and little access to health, sanitation, or clean water. 
Freedom of exchange, labour contract, social opportunities, and protective security are 
not just ends or constituent components of development but also important means to 
development and freedom.  
 
Sen’s welfare theory relies not on individuals’ attainments (of basic needs) but 
individuals’ capabilities, an approach he believes can draw on a richer information base. 
From a feasible capability set, Sen focuses on a small number of basic functionings 
central to wellbeing. For Sen, living consists of the effective freedom of a person to 
achieve states of beings and doings, or a vector of functionings. He does not assign 
particular weights to these functionings, as wellbeing is a ‘broad and partly opaque 
concept’, which is intrinsically ambiguous. Sen focuses on a small number of basic 
functionings central to wellbeing, such as being adequately nourished, avoiding 
premature mortality, appearing in public without shame, being happy, and being free. 
This freedom to attain, rather than the functionings themselves, is the primary goal, 
meaning that capability does not correlate closely to attainment, such as income. One 
example is life expectancy, a proxy for health, which, at 77 years, is as high for Costa 
Rica as for the USA, which has an income per head nine times as high. Moreover, men 
in the Harlem district of New York City, despite the capability sets and choices 
available to the US society, have less chance of living to 40 years than men in 
Bangladesh. This is not because Harlem has a lower GNP per capita than Bangladesh, 
Sen explains, but because of the high urban crime rate, inadequacy of medical attention, 
racism, and other factors that reduce Harlem’s basic attainments. Although people in 
Harlem have a greater command of resources than those in Bangladesh, the costs of 
social functionings, which include avoiding public shame and participating in the life of 
the community, are higher for Harlem residents (as well as USA residents generally, 
Sen argues) than for Bangladeshis.12  
 
For Sen (1992: 102-16), poverty is not low wellbeing but the inability to pursue 
wellbeing because of the lack of economic means. He argues against relying only on 
poverty percentage or headcount approach (H) to measure poverty and deprivation, the 
                                                 
12 Sen (1973, 1981, 1987a, 1992, 1999); Sugden (1993: 1947-62); McCord and Freeman (1990). Sen was 
the inspiration and intellectual force behind the UN’s annual Human Development Report (1990-2004).   8
approach of World Bank economists, Ahluwalia et al. (1979: 299-341). As Blackwood 
and Lynch (1994: 569) assert in their criticism of Ahluwalia et al., ‘poverty does not 
end abruptly once an additional dollar of income raises a family’s (or individual’s) 
income beyond a discretely defined poverty line. It is more accurate to conceive of 
poverty as a continuous function of varying gradation’. In addition to (H), Sen contends, 
we need an income-gap approach (I), which measures the additional income needed to 
bring the poor up to the level of the poverty line, and the distribution of income or Gini 
coefficient (G) among the poor. Combining G, H, and I, which together represent the 
Sen measure for assessing the seriousness of absolute poverty, satisfies Sen’s three 
axioms for a poverty index: (1) the focus axiom, which stipulates that the measure 
depend only on the incomes of the poor; (2) the monotonicity axiom, which requires 
that the poverty index increase when the incomes of the poor decrease; and (3) the weak 
transfer axiom, which requires that the poverty measure be sensitive to changes in the 
income distribution of the poor (so that a transfer of income from a lower income poor 
household to a higher income household increases the index). 
 
The World Bank, which became convinced of the validity of Sen’s critique of Bank 
analyses of poverty by 1990, defines the income or poverty gap as ‘the mean shortfall 
from the poverty line (counting the non-poor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a 
percentage of the poverty line. This measure reflects the depth of poverty as well as its 
incidence’. In 2000, Bangladesh’s $1/day headcount poverty rate was 36.0 per cent, 
while its $1/day poverty gap was 8.1 per cent (World Bank 2003b: 58-61). While 36 per 
cent of Bangladesh’s population was extremely poor, a transfer of 8.1 per cent of GNP 
would bring the income of every extremely poor person exactly up to the $1/day line. In 
China, while $1/day poverty was 16.1 per cent, the cost of bringing the income of these 
poor to the $1/day line was only 3.7 per cent (Ibid.: 58). For LDCs generally, 19 per 
cent $1/day poverty13 could be reduced by a 1 per cent transfer from LDC consumption 
or a one-half of one per cent transfer from world consumption. This assumes perfect 
non-distortionary targeting to the extreme poor without reducing mean consumption. 
Alas, we do not have perfect information to identify the poor nor do we know the effect 
of this transfer on the income of the nonpoor. Yet we have information on countries 
with extreme poverty and some information on the regions, classes, and communities of 
the extreme poor.  
2.8  Sen’s view of gender inequality 
Sen’s discussion of income distribution includes intra-family and gender inequality, 
missing in Seers’ analysis of 1979. For Sen (1993), the most obvious example of 
cultures’ anti-female biases is the ‘missing’ women of India and China, their deficits of 
females from infanticide and anti-female health biases compared to a benchmark or 
norm for the ratio of females to males. In China, where the state irregularly enforced a 
‘one couple, one child’ policy, expectant couples may use sonograms to identify the 
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gender of the fetus, sometimes aborting female children. Moreover, a small fraction of 
Indian and Chinese couples practice female infanticide. Additionally, in Mumbai, India, 
women had to be more seriously ill than men to be taken to a hospital. India, China, and 
the Middle East, with low female to male ratios, have a bias in nutrition and health care 
that favours males. Discrimination against women in schools, jobs, and other economic 
opportunities lies behind the bias against the care of females within the family (Sen 
1993: 40-7). 
2.9  Sen’s view of food entitlements, the state, and famines 
Econometric and case study evidence indicates that war and state violence increase 
nutritional vulnerability.14 Relief agencies indicate 20 million deaths from severe 
malnutrition in 1991 in six African countries—Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, 
Angola, and Mozambique—where food trade was disrupted by domestic political 
conflict. Moreover, while, on the one hand, food deficits contribute to refugee problems, 
on the other hand, the five million or so refugees annually fleeing civil wars, natural 
disasters, and political repression (including before 1990, South Africa’s 
destabilization) added to Africa’s food shortages.15 
 
The conventional economic approach examines food (or total) output and its 
distribution, focusing on agricultural production, poverty rates, and Gini indices of 
concentration. According to this explanation, famine arises from a decline in food 
availability (Ravallion 1997: 1207-08). Amartya Sen (1981, 1983b) and Drèze and Sen 
(1989) criticize this explanation, emphasizing that nutrition depends on society’s system 
of entitlement. Entitlement refers to the set of alternative commodity bundles that a 
person can command in a society using the totality of rights and opportunities that he or 
she possesses. An entitlement helps people acquire capabilities (like being well 
nourished). In a market economy, the entitlement limit is based on ownership of factors 
of production and exchange possibilities (through trade or a shift in production 
possibilities). For most people, entitlement depends on the ability to find a job, the wage 
rate, and the prices of commodities bought. In a welfare or socialist economy, 
entitlement also depends on what families can obtain from the state through the 
established system of command. A hungry, destitute person will be entitled to 
something to eat, not by society’s low Gini inequality and a high food output per capita, 
but by a relief system offering free food. Thus, in 1974, thousands of people died in 
Bangladesh despite its low inequality, because floods reduced rural employment along 
with output, and inflation cut rural labourers’ purchasing power. 
 
Sen argues that food is ‘purchased’ with political pressure as well as income. 
Accordingly, one-third of the Indian population goes to bed hungry every night and 
                                                 
14 Nafziger et al. (2000); Nafziger and Auvinen (2003). 
15 Daley (1992: 115); Goliber (1989: 10-11).   10
leads a life ravaged by regular deprivation. India’s social system takes non-acute 
endemic hunger in stride, there are no headlines or riots. But while India’s politicians do 
not provide entitlements for chronic or endemic malnutrition, they do so for potential 
severe famine through food imports, redistribution, and relief. In Maoist China, the 
situation was almost the opposite. Its political commitment ensured lower regular 
malnutrition through more equal access to means of livelihood and state-provided 
entitlement to basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter. In a normal year, China’s poor 
were much better fed than India’s. Yet if there was a political and economic crisis that 
confused the regime so that it pursued disastrous policies with confident dogmatism, 
then it could not be forced to change its policies by crusading newspapers or effective 
political opposition pressure, as in India.16 
 
The Nafziger-Auvinen (2003: 138-40) political economy approach analyses the 
behaviour of ruling elites during periods of Darwinian pressures and food crises. This 
approach goes beyond Sen to examine ruling elites’ deliberate withholding of 
entitlement, or even use of violence, to achieve their goals of acquiring or maintaining 
power, which often involves benefits at the expenses of other segments of the 
population. Thus, according to this political economy analysis, Mao’s effort to increase 
control (and reduce the influence of pragmatist Liu Shaochi) through collective-
intensive water projects during the 1958-60 Great Leap Forward contributed to China’s 
famine, in which per capita food production from 1957-59 to 1959-61 dropped 25 per 
cent. Indeed amid Mao’s campaign for increasing collectivization in 1959, the pressure 
of the party establishment contributed to false reports of bumper crops.17 
 
Sen’s (1981: 44) ‘entitlement approach to starvation and famine concentrates on the 
ability of people to command food through the legal means available in the society’ and 
not ‘for example illegal transfers (e.g. looting)’.18 Sen, using this approach, turns a 
blind eye to the possibility that the state may be the cause of famine through deliberate 
policy to transfer resources and food entitlements from a politically marginal group to a 
politically favoured one. To be sure, Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen (1989: 5-6) point out 
that, ‘The dependence of one group’s ability to command food on its relative position 
and comparative power vis-à-vis other groups can be especially important in a market 
economy.’ But for Sen and his coauthor, famines and food shortages result from 
entitlement and state policy failure, and not from state action to damage the food 
entitlements of a group. They attribute the Soviet famines of the 1930s and the 
Kampuchean famines of the late 1970s to inflexible government policies that 
undermined the power of particular sections of the population to command food. Drèze 
                                                 
16 Sen (1983a: 757-60); Sen (1983b); Sen (1986: 125-32); Sen (1987b: 10-14). 
17 Prybyla (1970: 264-9); Lardy (1983: 152-3); Putterman (1993: 11); Ravallion (1997: 1225-6). 
18 For Drèze and  Sen (1989: 22), ‘It would be, particularly, a mistake to relate the causation of famines 
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and Sen’s emphasis is on the need for public action by a benign state, making decisions 
about more or less food entitlements, rather than an ill-intentioned state, with much of 
the population facing a dog-eat-dog existence, making decisions to intervene in favour 
of one group at the expense of another and its food entitlement. For Drèze and Sen 
(1989: 17-18), avoiding famine involves the ‘division of benefits [from the] differential 
pulls coming from divergent interest groups’, not stopping the denial of groups’ 
entitlements to food illegally or extra-legally.  
 
As Keen (1994: 5) contends, in Drèze and Sen’s view, ‘There are victims of famine, but 
few immediate culprits or beneficiaries’. Drèze and Sen do not consider the possibility 
that states or politically powerful groups that control states may obstruct relief and 
contribute to famine for rational purposes of their own. Indeed the Drèze and Sen 
conception of the state is essentially a liberal one, in which the failure to factor in the 
public interest is perceived as a failure of public policy. Most scholars and international 
agencies share the Drèze-Sen view, widely perceiving famine as relief ‘blunders’ and 
the result of poverty and market forces, and failing to see how markets are shaped or 
forced by state-condoned raiding, collusion, and intimidation (as in Darfur in 2005). 
Sen’s approach understates the extent to which starvation is in weak or failed states 
whose rulers perpetuate violence and withhold food against large numbers of their 
people.  
3 Conclusion 
In the last 20-30 years, changing events and new disciplinary tools have changed 
development economics substantially. Despite these changes, many controversies about 
the meaning of development remain. Yet there is an underlying consensus within the 
development community for the need to accelerate growth and reduce hunger, poverty, 
illiteracy, preventable disease, LDC debt burdens, gender inequality, and unsustainable 
environmental damage. Perhaps development economists can become public 
intellectuals to stop the declining commitment to development and interest in its 
meaning. Can today’s economists, similar to Dudley Seers (1920-1983) and Amartya 
Sen (1933-), muster the passion, pragmatism, and communication skills to lobby for 
development? Yes. Sen speaks frequently in the West and South Asia about the 
importance of development issues. I list two examples of others who have joined the 
public dialogue on the meaning and importance of development. Joseph Stiglitz’s 
insights from his World Bank and US Council of Economic Advisors experience 
provide a platform for addressing the general public on development issues. Jeffrey 
Sachs, advisor to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on poverty, has 
popularized discussions on how to end poverty. 
 
The goals of Seers and Sen to reduce deprivation, discrimination, and conflict, and their 
scepticism about nations’ commitments to these reductions still resonate within the 
development community. Seers and Sen were both interested in the nexus between   12
development, political rights, and peace but did not provide a systematic view of its 
interrelationships. One challenge for future work is for development economists to be 
more holistic in discussing the meaning of development, integrating economic 
development, human rights, and conflict reduction.  
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